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oger Ailes, a former advisor to Ronald Reagan, 
recalls in his book an intriguing practice of the 
ancient Romans: when they finished building 
a bridge or an arch, they enforced accountability by 
placing the engineer in charge beneath the 
construction when the scaffolding was removed. If the 
edifice did not hold, he was the first to know. We do 
not follow such drastic practices these days in Europe, 
but with some European economies shaking and the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis still not over, the 
architecture of the euro area has been certainly come 
under severe stress. Unfortunately, the 28-29 October 
2010 European Council Summit has not made this 
architecture much safer. 
What has been agreed upon in Brussels? The 
European heads of state and governments mandated 
Herman Van Rompuy, the EU’s permanent President, 
and the European Commission to conduct further 
inspections of the euro area economic governance. 
However, the reading of the summit’s conclusions 
suggest that forthcoming consultations with the 
member states should primarily focus on designing a 
“permanent crisis mechanism” to safeguard the euro 
area as a whole. In this respect, the ‘no bail-out’ 
clause in Art. 125 TFEU will most probably not be 
touched but rather annulled by a re-interpretation of 
Art. 122 TFEU. That is, the threats to the stability of 
the euro area as a whole will be interpreted as an 
“exceptional occurrence” beyond a member state’s 
control, thereby justifying bail-outs. Such changes to 
the Treaty most probably only require secondary 
legislation, which can be implemented without a 
referendum in the member states. The reason for 
calling for such treaty changes pertains to some 
member states’ fear – in particular in Germany – that 
certain provisions of the current discretionary scheme 
will not sustain judicial review in national courts. 
What’s the backdrop of the Summit? The European 
Council was intended to address the challenges posed 
by very recent events. Just some months ago, in an 
immediate reaction to the deteriorated market 
sentiments towards the euro, the EU put together two 
comprehensive stabilisation programmes, one for 
Greece worth €110 billion, and one for the whole euro 
area, the so-called European Stabilisation Programme, 
worth €750 billion. Both support packages have been 
approved despite being hugely controversial among 
economists and policy-makers. This was the right 
decision to take on such short notice, but long-term 
challenges remain that need to be addressed by 
overhauling EMU’s economic governance. 
Looking at the Brussels summit from this perspective, 
making the bail-out mechanism rules-based and 
explicit would in principle be a step in the right 
direction. However, the provisions of a permanent 
crisis mechanism seemingly agreed at the Summit are 
by far not satisfactory. Such a mechanism should be 
guarded by a high degree of accountability and strong 
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constraints on fiscal profligacy at the political level, 
for example, by establishing ‘exit rules’. 
Why? Early worries about the negative consequences 
of the EU bail-out aired by some commentators and 
policy-makers were largely overblown. When the EU 
took action, an oft-heard assessment was and still 
seems to be among many economists that i) the bail-
out was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it 
was irrational and iii) the bail-out would create a 
moral hazard problem. Contrary to these warnings, 
however, we have recently shown that given EMU’s 
present political-economic set-up, i) the bail-out was 
unavoidable, ii) the lengthy process of political 
haggling leading to it was understandable, and iii) a 
bail-out does not have to necessarily be associated 
with a future moral hazard problem. Our analysis has 
been based on a model that allows us to understand 
why and how the parties involved in the Greek crisis 
arrived at the bail-out and on what conditions the final 
solution depends. Importantly, we have formally 
taken account of the ‘negative externality’ problem 
that has been central to policy debates related to the 
EMU’s institutional design since the very birth of the 
euro (see, for example, Gros et al., 2005). This 
externality also played an important role in the 
specific case of the Greek crisis, with some 
commentators even calling it a ‘bail-out blackmail’ 
(see Mayer, 2010). Contrary to the existing literature, 
however, we have not only focused on the economic 
aspect of such a negative externality, but also looked 
at how it emanates and interact with the political 
factors, in particular the dynamics of the political 
negotiation process within the EU. 
The major factor that explains the difference between 
our results and the contrasting results of other 
commentators is that our analysis has been 
conditioned upon the present political-economic set-
up of the EMU. This seems crucial in the EU context, 
since the Greek crisis – as practically all other EU 
affairs – involved intense negotiations among the 
member countries and depended to a large extent on 
political factors. An analysis that does not take 
account of these interactions between the economic 
and political factors must be incomplete as it abstracts 
from a very important part of EU reality. After all, the 
EMU problems do not only ensue from the Greek and 
other European countries’ fiscal problems alone, but 
from the interactions of these problems with the actual 
political-economic configuration of the EMU. The 
sheer fact that countries share the same currency does 
not necessarily have to lead to negative spillovers 
between them. As Balcerowicz (2010) rightly points 
out, if this was the case, the fiscal problems in 
Ecuador, a dollarized country, would give rise to a 
threat to the dollar – evidently this is not the case. In 
the EMU, however, refinancing difficulties of a small 
country like Greece, which accounts for only 2% of 
the euro area’s GDP, can trigger a systemic crisis for 
the whole EMU. This is different from the case of the 
US monetary union where fiscal woes of even such 
big states as California do not wreak such havoc. 
The weakness of the current EMU governance is that 
it neither provides sufficient incentives for curtailing 
excessive lending and indebtedness (for more, see de 
Haan et al., 2004), nor secures the level of political 
integration necessary to attain a sufficient degree of 
accountability in fiscal affairs. Strengthening fiscal 
prudence is of utmost importance, but it has 
consistently collided with the enforceability problem 
of applying supra-national fiscal rules to sovereign 
member states. The current architecture of EMU does 
not carry. While stepping-up the degree of political 
integration could alleviate this tension, policy-makers 
in Europe are well aware of how lengthy this process 
would be and how naïve it is to believe that political 
integration could be significantly accelerated.  
Squeezed between the undesirable now and the far-off 
future, EMU needs to develop some intermediate 
solutions that would help to bridge this gap. Two 
possible avenues include the following solutions. 
First, should a bail-out be unavoidable, given the 
current state of the political-economic configuration 
of the EMU – as our analysis suggests – it is better to 
make it rule-based and explicit. This may at least limit 
the haggling and uncertainty in the course of such 
events resulting in a lower risk premium associated 
with such uncertainty (see Bini Smaghi, 2010, who 
makes a similar case in the context of financial 
markets). In this respect, our analysis lends support to 
the incipient discussion of sovereign bankruptcy 
(Financial Times, 2010) and earlier proposals for a 
European Monetary Fund suggested by Gros & Mayer 
(2010). However, any form of legal sovereign 
insolvency rules has to reinstate the cost-by-cause 
principle in European fiscal affairs by bringing 
accountability back to the member state level. 
Therefore, second, to improve EMU’s functioning, 
more weight should be given to solutions that address 
the issue of negative externality on a political level 
and not only an economic one. One way to approach 
this could be to change political incentives in the 
negotiation processes of the EMU. In a sense, this 
would address the political aspect of the political-
economic set-up of the EMU and hence would 
complement the necessary (but so far largely failed) 
efforts to improve the EU and domestic fiscal 
frameworks per se. One such solution could be to 
establish ‘exit rules’. Specifying conditions for 
leaving the EMU, including the costs and legal 
requirements of such an operation, would work at 
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i)  On the constituency level, it would make exit 
costs explicit to electorates, thus diminishing 
tendencies to fiscal bias. 
ii)  On the government level, it would weaken the 
bargaining position of troubled countries vis-à-
vis the rest of EU-member countries – 
concomitantly reducing Mayer’s ‘blackmail’ 
practices in terms of deliberately using the 
negative externality risk to elicit fiscal 
redistribution from other members. 
iii)  On the markets level, it would reduce 
uncertainty and stabilise market reaction in case 
of a future potential default or exit, thus 
decreasing the scope for a negative externality. 
Overall, making exit costs and procedures explicit 
would increase the perceived costs of a legally 
possible exit relative to the short-term political costs 
of economic adjustment. This would serve as a 
deterrent to brinkmanship, stimulate fiscal discipline 
and decrease the scope of the inherent negative 
externality problem within the euro area. While 
additional research is needed to shed more light on the 
political economics of crafting such exit rules, it 
seems that the existence of the rules would strengthen 
accountability in fiscal affairs and sustainability of the 
euro area in the long-run. Paradoxically, it may make 
future exits less – not more – probable, as shown by 
the history of certain national states struggling to 
preserve their internal integration (see Economist, 
2005). Their experience suggests that when secession 
is not permitted, a pressure for it rises. When 
secession is openly allowed, many would-be 
secessionists cease to press so hard for it – or for a 
bail-out, as is the case with the Greek-type crisis. 
Just before the euro was launched, Bordo & Jonung 
(1999) highlighted in an extensive study of historical 
monetary unions that political factors had been always 
the key determinants of their success or failure. 
Recent EMU experience clearly approves of this 
message. While most economists agree on this point, 
when it comes to designing reform proposals we tend 
to focus mainly on economic solutions, whereas 
political incentives are usually taken as given. This 
may be a mistake. After all, EMU is as much a 
political as an economic project. Including both 
dimensions in a policy analysis may lead to a better 
policy design and make the euro-area architecture 
safer. In this respect, accountability is not achieved by 
the mere provision of a permanent bail-out facility. 
This may possibly even erode the foundations of the 
architecture in terms of deteriorating public approval 
toward Europe in some member states. It’s symbolic 
that euro banknotes feature bridges and arches – 
perhaps also an omen. 
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